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James Boyd White 
The Cultural Background 
of The Legal Imagination 
I want to speak in this essay about one aspect of the origins of what is of-
ten called the law and literature movement in the United States,1 namely, 
how it got going. I shall do this by explaining the aims and assumptions 
of my own early contribution to it in the form of The Legal Imagination 
(first published in 1973). What I say will thus have some of the features of 
autobiography, but I hope it will be plain that this story is not really about 
me but about the state of the culture in which modern law and literature 
emerged. 
At the time this book was written there was very little that connected 
the law with the literary humanities in a self-conscious way. But any claim 
that law and humanities began in 1973 would obviously be ludicrous, for 
the connections between law and the arts oflanguage go all the way back 
to the beginnings of law in European history. The lawyer was, for the 
Greek and Roman alike, in large measure a rhetorician. Rhetoric was the 
center of European education until at least the seventeenth century, and 
long after that it was believed that a good education in the humanistic past 
was essential to excellence in law. The institution of the university began 
with schools of law, in Bologna and elsewhere, and law was seen to be 
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naturally connected to philosophy, history, philology, ;111d theology (e.g., 
see Gilmore). 
In the nineteenth .md much of the twentieth century, it would have 
been obvious to most lawyers that they \\-ere speakers and writers by oc-
cupation, that law itself was a br,111ch of the larger culture ( sec i-:crguson, 
Law). One need look no further than J usticc frankfurter's famous advice 
to a twelve-year-old boy who wished to become a lawyer: 
My dear Paul: 
No one can be a truly competent l.1wycr unless he is ,l cultiv,ncd man. 
If! were you, I would forget all .1bout anv tcchnic.11 prcpar,nion for the 
law. The best w.1y to prcp.m: for the law is to come to the study of the 
law as a well-read person. Thus alone can one .Kquirc the capacitv to 
use the English language on paper .md in speech and with the habits 
of clear thinking which only a truly liberal education can give. No less 
important for a lawyer is the cultivation of the imaginative faculties by 
reading poetry, seeing great paintings, in the original or in c,1sily avail-
able reproductions, and listening to great music. Stock your mind with 
the deposit of much good reading, and widen and deepen your feelings 
by experiencing vicariously as much as possible the wonderfi.il mysteries 
of the universe, and forget all about your future career. 
With good wishes, 
Sincerely yours, 
[swned] Felix Frankfurter 
( qtd. in E. London, Law 725) 
It is really only in the rather odd intellectual climate of the mid-
twentieth century and beyond that it would have been possible to think 
that the law had no connection with the other arts of language and disci-
plines of thought we normally think of as constituting the humanities. In 
my view, this blindness to the obvious was produced by a convergence of a 
set of influences: in philosophy, the kind of logical positivism that wanted 
to reduce meaning to the empirically testable; the more general view that 
science simply eclipses the value of other forms of thought ( and with it the 
desire to claim the status of "science" for the study of social, political, and 
economic phenomena); a widespread desire at a time of international peril 
to affirm the masculinity of science against the perceived femininity of the 
humanities; and the self-conscious turn to what is called social science in 
the law, first in the form of sociology and psychology, then of economics. 
The assumptions here were that these fields could produce knowledge of a 
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sort that the humanities could not; that this knowledge was testable; and 
that it could be the foundation of law-law based upon social realities 
that were accurately represented by disciplines that shared the name, and 
hoped to share the prestige, of science. The idea that law could be seen as 
one of the social sciences became prevalent in the 1930s, under the rubric 
of legal realism, and it has since grown more intense. 
I will return to this way of thinking in just a moment. My point now 
is a simpler one, that when I and others began to think of connecting the 
law with the world of humanities and literature, what we were doing was 
not something new and shocking, though that is how some saw it and 
perhaps how it felt to us, but something very old-fashioned indeed. We 
were seeking to make conscious a tradition that went back to the begin-
nings of legal thought in the West. But this was a tradition that took itself 
largely for granted, and there was very little that addressed it directly. By 
the time I was in law school in the early 1960s, for example, there were 
only a scattering of contemporary pieces explicitly about the connections 
between law and literature: an essay by Justice Cardozo ("Law" 3-52); a 
fine article on judicial style by Walker Gibson; a popular anthology com-
piled by Ephraim London ( World); and important work by Owen Barfield 
(see Tennyson 56), an English lawyer (of whose work at the time I was 
unfortunately not aware). But it is fair to say that there was no widespread 
drive to connect the activities oflaw with what could be learned from our 
humanistic past. Thus to look at the law, as I wished to do, as an art of 
thought and language, with its own characteristic concerns and methods, 
was simultaneously old-fashioned and newfangled, surprising to almost 
everyone. 
I was often asked-as you may want to ask-What can literature pos-
sibly have to do with law? This question, repeated over and over again as 
I began my work, and indeed since then too, reflects in my view a deep 
misunderstanding of the nature of both literature and law, sometimes on 
the part of those who profess one or the other. 2 
In order to speak about the way in which connections between these 
two fields of activity can be drawn, by showing how they were in fact 
drawn in my own early work, I shall need to speak about my own educa-
tion, in law school and before. For my ways of imagining the law and the 
literature that I was interested in connecting were to a large degree shaped 
by the ways in which I was taught these things both at the university and 
in the practice of law. My vision of law and literature, that is, was based 
upon a particular idea of what law is, or can be, as well as a certain idea of 
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what literature is, and what cm be k.1rned from it. I slull bq,;in b,· trving 
to explain these two ide.1s, tr.King them out in term~ ofnw t:duc.1tion-.111 
education that made it both surprising to connect these .1pparentlv diftcr-
ent things and at the same time, by .1 sort ofp.1r.1dox, quitt: .1 n.1tural thing 
to do. 
I shall begin with what "litnatun:" me.mt to one t:duc.1tt:d .1s I ,yas. In 
college I studied mainly Grct:k and English liter.Hurt:. (;reek cxpost:d me 
to the wondcrfi.11 works that arc a\'ailabk only in that l.mguagc - Homer, 
Plato, Euripides, and Sophocles-and introduo:d me to the rc.1lity oflan-
guagc difference itself. One docs not and cannot think the s.11nt: w.1y in 
Greek and in English. In each of these languages one can do .md say things 
that one cannot in the other, for each expresses its own culture-its own 
values, its own sense of what should count as reason, its own way of imag-
ining or constituting the social and natural worlds. Tht: study of other 
languages has always been central to the humanities, and fr>r good reason: 
it teaches us that the ways we think, our ways of imagining ourselves and 
the world we inhabit, are not the only ways. The study of other languages 
puts into question our own language and the assumptions implicit in it; 
in doing so, it makes possible a certain kind of cultural criticism, one that 
holds out the possibility of growth beyond the taken-for-granteds of our 
own world.3 For me the study of Greek held this kind of promise, and 
when I turned to law, it was natural for me to regard law as a language too, 
as one way among many of doing things with words. 
As for the study of English literature, I was trained in the close reading 
of literary texts, especially poems, a kind of reading sometimes spoken of 
as the New Criticism. The main idea of this kind of work is that what hap-
pens in language, especially in artful language like that of the best poems, 
can be enormously complex and important, and this in several dimensions 
simultaneously: aesthetically, intellectually, emotionally, ethically, even po-
litically. We learned that the meaning of a literary expression is not statable 
in the form of a proposition or an idea but lies in the complex experience of 
engagement with it, an experience that has its own shape and significance 
and that can be apprehended only by a mind and imagination trained to 
observe and respond to such things. 4 We believed that understanding a 
literary expression of the best kind requires the highest and most complete 
intelligence. In this sense, learning to read and judge the best literature 
was thought to be an education of the whole mind, and a worthy goal for 
a whole life. 
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Built into this process was the activity of judgment. We would argue 
endlessly about the merits of a poem or novel or the style of a prose writer. 
Is this a really good poem or story or sentence, or is it flawed, defective, 
weak? Is it somehow great despite its flaws-or even because of them? This 
judgment was not merely an aesthetic one: the question mainly had to do 
with the quality of thought and imagination, its comprehensiveness and 
truthfulness, its openness to contrasting truths, its capacity for new and liv-
ing speech, and this on the most important of human topics: war and death, 
love and art, truth and knowledge, meaning and meaninglessness. 5 The 
literary judgment was thus also an ethical one, sometimes a political one. 
It was a premise of our work that to read well required one to write 
well. The quality of our own expressions mattered supremely, we were 
taught, for it is in the quality of one's expression that one demonstrates, 
for good or ill, the quality of one's mind, of one's imagination, of one's 
education; this is where one shows how far one has realized, or failed to 
realize, the possibilities for meaning that distinguish human life. 
In this way we came to see that literature was not to be regarded 
merely as an item of high consumption, like fine wine, or as an elegance of 
life, but lay at the center of our own imaginative and expressive lives: for 
we, like the writers we read, could collapse into empty cliches, sentimental 
slogans, or the vices of advertising or propaganda; or, like them, we could 
try to find ways to use our language to say things worthy of respect. This 
sense of the danger and power of language was to be of great help to me 
when it came to the study of law. 
I loved this kind of engagement with language and literature, but when 
I went to graduate school, with the idea of becoming a professor of En-
glish, I found that there ( unlike my college) literature was seen as a field 
of activity set apart from ordinary life, and from politics and ethics as well. 
To put it in a word, the reading of literature was professionalized, and 
for me that threatened its value. So I decided not to make my life simply 
as a reader of literature but to go to law school instead, with the object 
of becoming a lawyer. I naturally imagined the legal education I sought 
as learning to read and write well the language of the law, which was of 
course a language of power. Without quite knowing it, I was discovering 
that the study of literature needed the law, just as I was soon to discover 
that the law needed literature. 
As you can see, I already had an idea of what the law was-an activity 
of mind and language-and it was not one widely shared in the general 
34 The Lclfctl Imapi1111tio11 
culture. It was and is common for nonlawn:rs .md nc\\· b\\' students alike 
to think of the law simply as a system of rules, sometimes c.1st in r.1ther 
technical and arcane terms. On such a Yicw, a legal education consists 
mainly of learning the rules, including \\'here necessary the special me.m-
ing of the terms of art in \\'hich they are expressed. The applic.1tion of the 
rules is thought to be simple enough: one looks at the world to sec whether 
the rule applies or does not, then makes one's commonsense judgment. 
What sets the lawyer apart from other people is his or her knowledge of 
the rules and where to find them. Of course there may be problems in in-
terpretation and application, but these arc not very interesting and can be 
handled by rough common sense. What matters on this Yicw is the system 
of law itself; its purposes and its coherence, matters that can be thought 
about largely in terms established by sociology or political science or even 
economICs. 
In an American law school of my era much energy was devoted to 
upsetting this simplistic vision of law. Of course rules can be applied in a 
nonproblematic way a good bit of the time, we were taught, but that is 
not where lawyers and judges spend their time. They focus on problems 
of meaning, and these are constantly before us. In any legal case that gets 
very far, it will be possible to make competing and contrasting arguments 
about the meaning both of the facts and of the law, arguments that are 
rational, coherent, and have persuasive force. The defendant and plaintiff 
will maintain opposing views, with considerable power; judges will concur 
and dissent, again often with good reasons on both sides. 
The world of law-I speak especially of American law-is thus not 
a world of authoritarian clarity, not a world in which a system works itself 
out automatically, but a world of deep uncertainty and openness, of ten-
sion and conflict and argument, a world where reasons do not harmonize 
but oppose one another. This means that it is a world of learning and in-
vention, where a great premium is placed on one's ability to make sense of 
an immense body of material as it bears on a particular case. 
To learn to "think like a lawyer" was said to be the aim of law school. 
This activity was imagined as highly complex, comprehensive, exploratory 
and tentative, open to alternatives, subtle, and mature. Learning to think 
well in this mode was regarded as a proper object of an education, indeed 
of a life-just as at college I had been taught that learning to think well 
about literary texts, in literary ways, could be the object of a life. In both 
cases it was the quality of one's thought and expression that mattered 
above all. 
James Boyd White 35 
This is what my legal education was to be like. But, as I suggest ear-
lier, no one seemed to be consciously aware that this education was fun-
damentally literary and rhetorical in kind, with something to learn from 
other arts of language and culture. The law was seen as sui generis, its 
own unique cultural form with its own inherent intellectual and ethical 
merits.6 
Much to my surprise, then, my literary training was of real and practical 
value both in the study of law and, later on, in the practice of law. I was 
used to the close reading of texts; used to seeing in one composition or 
expression a range of possible meanings; used to arguing for one reading 
as dominant, against the reality of other possibilities; and, perhaps above 
all, used to seeing both in written and oral expressions performances of 
mind and imagination that could be done well or badly. In other words, 
there was from the beginning a natural point of connection for me be-
tween these two forms of activity and life, the reading of literary texts and 
the practices of law. 7 
I was prepared too, as I say above, to make judgments, both intellec-
tual and ethical in nature, about what people said or wrote. Just as a poem 
might be condemned as sentimental and a history as a string of received 
ideas, so a legal argument might be dismissed as conclusory or a judicial 
opinion as simply the unexamined reiteration of platitudes. Just as in lit-
erature we were trained to judge quality in a poem or novel, in law school 
we were being trained to see the vast differences between the good lawyer 
and the poor one, the good judge and the poor one-differences that 
made themselves apparent especially in what these people said, in the ways 
in which they thought and spoke, in the texts they produced. 
This view of things was borne out by my experience in law practice, 
where I was faced directly with the questions, What is excellence in the 
practice of law? How can I best try to attain it? In thinking about these 
matters I found myself attending, over and over, to what the best lawyers 
in our firm did and said with language, trying to understand what they 
were doing and why. The secret of their intellectual and professional qual-
ity to a large degree lay there, I thought, in what they found it possible to 
say, if only I could learn to see it. 
It seemed to me that the lawyer was asked again and again to address 
what I would call a literary moment, a moment in which the very question 
he or she was addressing was one of meaning: the meaning of the experi-
ence of a client or witness or opposing party; the meaning of a piece of 
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testimony; the meaning of a \\'ord or phr.1se in ,1 st.ltute or contract; and 
behind all these things the meaning of the tlucn1.1ting .rnd um:ntain mass 
of documents, principles, understandings, and crnwentions \\'l'. call the law. 
To a very large degree it was the lawyer who \\'as gi\'en the task of making 
that meaning and doing it \\'ell. 
For me, then, the law \\'as abo\'e .111 an .1etivity of mind and language, 
with all that involved, an acti\'ity that in\'ited comparison with other such 
activities, especially with the best works of our literary tradition, where we 
might find examples of the most important kinds of success. The center 
oflegal education, as I saw it, was the opportunity it afforded to stri\'e for 
excellence of thought and expression alike. The good lawyer, the good 
judge, were marked by a capacity for a kind of whole-minded attention 
and thought, one object of which was to transform oneself into a wiser 
and more acute intelligence. 
One of the premises of law as I learned it was that good and decent 
people can respectably and respectfully disagree about the outcome prop-
erly required by the law. What this means is that excellence, for lawyer and 
judge alike, is not to be confused with choosing the right result; it lies 
instead in the process of thought and imagination by which one articulates 
one's questions and thinks one's way through to one's conclusions. One 
could admire greatly a judge with whom one habitually disagreed and 
have deep contempt for one who normally voted like oneself. 8 
How then are we to think about the set of activities of mind and language 
the lawyer and judge must master? The answer of the law school in which 
I grew up was, simply by learning to do them. This was a kind of craft 
teaching. It was perhaps not thought necessary or even interesting to find 
a more explicit way of thinking about what we were doing,9 but that was 
what I wanted to do and tried to do in The Legal Imagination. My hope in 
this book was to develop a way of thinking about the activities of mind and 
imagination that lie at the heart oflaw-at what happens when a lawyer 
or judge is faced with a real problem in the world, a loss or conflict, and 
seeks to bring to bear upon it the language of the law. 10 
My method was to use a series of questions and writing assignments 
to ask the student to function both as a lawyer, speaking the language 
of the law, and in the other ways in which he or she had competence by 
education and experience. In the class we then looked at what the student 
produced with the eyes of the sort of legal and literary critic I had been 
trained to be, asking questions about the nature and limits of the language 
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used, the ways in which it has been replicated or transformed, the quality 
of mind revealed in the activity of thought and writing, and the ethical 
perils and opportunities it represented. 
One persistent question had to do with the language of the law, which 
the student must as a lawyer both speak and write: is it necessarily dead, 
formulaic, mechanical, empty (as it surely is in some hands); or is it-can 
it by art be made to be-alive, full of meaning and significance? To achieve 
this, the student must make his or her language the object of thought and 
attention, accept the responsibility for the use and transformation of it, 
and resist the human desire to collapse uncritically into its forms. 
The idea of the book is in this way to set up an internal dialogue in 
the student's head between the "law" the student is learning and whatever 
else he or she knows and is. As a way into these tensions I use both litera-
ture and ordinary language, but it could be anything of which the student 
has command, from music to mathematics to baseball or farming. 
Using this method, the book considers a range of questions and prob-
lems. How in a general way can one compare legal and literary expres-
sions? How does the law work as a system of meaning and social con -
struction? How does the lawyer's argument-the language, the way of 
thinking-change as he or she addresses different audiences? How should 
statutes be composed and interpreted? How should the law talk about hu-
man beings, especially in the insanity defense, in sentencing judgments, in 
institutions of various kinds, and in the language of race? How is the law 
used, for good or ill, to build human relations over time, to structure so-
cial expectations, to instill values that will guide discretion? How do judges 
and lawyers reason, and how should we decide whether a particular act of 
legal reasoning is good or bad? How can we understand and criticize the 
form ofliterature we call the judicial opinion? At the end, I shift emphasis, 
asking the student to think of the law itself in a metaphorical way: Is it a 
kind of poetry, of rhetoric, of history? Here the students have to find their 
own ways of talking. 
In all of this the student has been asked to think oflegal language and 
legal education as dangers: oflegal language as potentially narrow and tech-
nical and dull, as excluding from consideration virtually everything that 
matters, and as founded on a form, the rule, in which the truth can never 
be said; and oflegal education as habituating the student to this language, 
making his or her mind the servant of the language rather than the other 
way round. These are real problems, and worth thinking about. My hope 
was that as the student came to see that the life of the lawyer is a life of 
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writing and speech, of expression, of the arts of language, he or she would 
come to see it also as presenting opportunities of a unique kind-for what 
can be done with legal language cannot be done with anything else-and 
to recognize that the lite it offers can be one foll of interest and impor-
tance and value, at least if he or she can make it so. 
Notes 
Another version of this essay appears in longer form in Tmchin_rr Law in the 
Mirror of Literature, edited by Barbara Pozzo (2010). 
1. I need to say tlut this name is itself in question: sometimes people spe,1k 
of "law and the humanities," sometimes of "l.1w and language," sometimes of 
"law, culture, and humanities." WhateYer term is used, the kinds of work being 
done under this general rubric vary greatly in genre and intention alike. There is 
no organized program here, no commitment to an ideology, no plan of conquest. 
Rather, as is consistent with the nature of literature itself, and of the hum.rnities, 
the idea is that many flowers may bloom, different in shape and color. This means, 
among other things, that we cannot talk meaningfully about the promise or limits 
of something called "law and literature" as if it were a program based on a set of 
shared assumptions that necessarily shaped its productions. The kind of criticism 
called for here is not in that sense theoretical, not a global affirmation or rejection, 
but, like the work in question itself, particular in nature. 
2. Richard A. Posner's Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation seems 
to me in particular to misunderstand both law and literature. Posner finds that he 
can learn nothing from his reading of Homer, Shakespeare, and the rest except 
tricks for manipulating others through language, an unfortunate consequence of 
his own habits of reading that in my view says nothing about the works with which 
he finds he cannot valuably engage. See my review of this book, "What Can a 
Lawyer Learn from Literature?" 
3. The view of language and culture I sketch here is elaborated in my book 
When Words Lose Their Meaning. The point about language difference, and the art 
of reading and translation it requires, is developed in my Justice as Translation. 
4. For a classic statement of this thesis, see C. Brooks. 
5. The common idea that literature is somehow merely aesthetic in char-
acter, as though there were no substantive concerns in our greatest literature, is 
demonstrably wrong. The Iliad and Aeneid are about war, Dante's Commedia 
and Milton's Paradise Lost about the justice of God, Keats's "On a Grecian Urn" 
about art and time, Herbert's "Pulley" about the creation of man, Dickens's Bleak 
House about social injustice, Austen's Mansfield Park about human morality, and 
so on. What is true is that these works have their own ways of treating their subject, 
which is not that of the modern academic book or article, but in fact far harder to 
achieve and of far greater significance. 
6. How about social science? We were told that social science had much to 
offer the law, mainly in the form of reliable findings about the world. The idea was 
that, up until the moment at which modern social science made something else 
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possible, the law had had to rely on necessarily intuitive judgments about human 
behavior and motivation, on tradition and culture. Now psychology, sociology, 
and economics could provide a kind of scientific knowledge of the world on which 
legislatures and courts could rely in the formulation of rules and judgments. This 
was, and is, in my view completely unobjectionable. Of course the law should learn 
what it can about the world, from whatever reliable source. This is no threat to law, 
because law will in the end be the forum in which the reliability of the findings of 
social science will be debated and determined, just as is the case with other forms 
of expert testimony. The law will translate what can be said in these other ways into 
its own discourse and use them for its own purposes. 
7. Let me add a point. To a certain kind of mind, the question in reading is 
simply to ask what is the main idea. But in law, as in poetry and other forms oflit-
erature, the main idea is usually rather simply stated and it is not the real point. The 
poet is saying I am in love or full of grief or in despair; the First Amendment says 
speech is a good thing, the Fourth Amendment says people are to be protected 
against searches, and so on. But you could write a book, or teach a whole course, 
about the significance of the ways in which Shakespeare says in his sonnets that he is 
in love or despair; likewise, you could write a book or teach a whole course about 
the ways in which speech is protected under the First Amendment. Life and quality 
are in the style, not imagined simply as a form of elegance, but as all that matters 
most when one uses language. 
8. Contemporary interest in the quality of legal thought is well expressed 
in the preface to the first volume of the distinguished journal the Supreme Court 
Review: "In many recent comments on the Court and its critics, the point has been 
made that, in the words of Professor Henry Hart, 'neither at the bar nor among 
the faculties oflaw schools is there an adequate tradition of sustained, disinterested, 
and competent criticism of the professional qualities of the Court's opinions.' It 
is believed that one of the reasons for this deficiency has been the absence of a 
publication devoted exclusively to the presentation of such criticism. This annual, 
then, proposes to fill the gap by providing a forum in which the best minds in the 
field will be encouraged freely to express their critical judgments. Over and over 
again, justices of the Supreme Court have announced the desirability of, indeed 
the necessity for, such critiques of their work. It is hoped that The Supreme Court 
Review will meet that need" (Preface). 
9. One important effort to be self-conscious about the law was the fine course 
taught by Albert Sacks and Henry Hart, The Legal Process. Their materials have 
since been published by Foundation Press. 
10. For more recent reflections on teaching law, see my From Expectation to 
Experience. 
